Counterfire at the Corps and Division

The counterfire battle is not a separate battle, but just one aspect of the overall combined arms fight and is inseparably tied to current and future operations so that fire superiority can be achieved (ATP 3-09.12 pg 1-5). At echelon, planners and staffs owe contribution to the operational framework and through the integration of boundaries and Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs) that, respectively, delineate areas of responsibility and facilitate rapid counterfire. Failure here results in a challenge to effectively integrate counterfire into operations. The purpose of this article is to offer education and one interpretation on enabling effective counterfire at Corps and Division echelons, and how understanding counterfire relationships and roles and responsibilities of Corps and Divisions will lead to a better understanding of how to best integrate counterfire.

Counterfire is fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons and provides freedom for maneuver by destroying or neutralizing the enemy indirect fire capabilities. (ATP 3-09.12 p. 1-5). In LSCO, Corps and Divisions are responsible for counterfire throughout the depth of their AO. Counterfire is further categorized into proactive and reactive counterfire.

            Proactive counterfire is intended to detect and deliver against the enemy’s strike capability before it can impact friendly operations. (FM 3-09 p 3-7). Proactive counterfire in other words      is targeting and includes Weapons Locating Radar (WLR) zone management, sensor tasking authority, and adherence to the Decide, Detect, Deliver (D3A) methodology. ATP 3-09.12 Counterfire, begins      with discussion of targeting and FM 3-60 likewise, discusses      targeting with reference to proactive counterfire, further emphasizing their relationship to each other.

            Reactive counterfire provides immediate organic or joint fires to neutralize, destroy, or suppress enemy indirect fire weapons once acquired. (ATP 3-09.12 1-7) Reactive counterfire is a math problem that compares the acquisition plus delivery time against the time required for the enemy to displace. The key to this process is having a dedicated Counterfire Headquarters (CFHQ) that controls the Q53s and a designated counterbattery shooter that can fully streamline the sensor-to-shooter process.  All acquisitions go to the CFHQ, and that headquarters has the full authority to determine whether a mission will be shot. This depends primarily on creating a permissive environment for fires.

The operational framework is the basis for everything. Boundaries define areas of operation and with them, limits of responsibility to commanders. ATP 3-09.12 states that Corps and Divisions are responsible for counterfire within their respective AO, which are defined by boundaries. After the establishment of the framework, comes the integration of fire support coordination measures (FSCM).

One key FSCM to understand is the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). Codified in Joint Doctrine, “An FSCL is a fire support coordination measure established by land or amphibious force commander to support common objectives within an area of operations” (JP 3-09). The FSCL specifies coordination requirements for the joint attack of surface targets and applies to all fires. It is a permissive FSCM where forward of the FSCL is permissive for the Air Component Commander (ACC) and short of the FSCL is permissive to the Land Component Commander (LCC). The preponderance of effects beyond the FSCL comes predominantly from the air component and short of the FSCL, from the land component.

This is mainly why fires beyond      the FSCL require     coordination with affected commanders, usually through the integration of Airspace Coordinating Measures (ACMs) and is what slows things down when ACMs aren’t planned (JP 3-09, pg A-5). With regards to counterfire, planners should rethink the environment short of the FSCL to primarily facilitate indirect fires by planning the FSCL on the Division’s forward boundary, specifically, to keep the control of air clean between the air component and the JAGICs. Airspace planners should proactively plan ACMs that support counterfire imperatives mentioned in ATP 3-09.12 that work with FSCMs and do not constrain options to planners in even the most dynamic environments.       

The Corps proactive counterfire fight should mostly be fought using joint air assets mainly due to the mobility and depth of targets in the Corps deep area.  Corps reactive counterfire is not feasible with FA assets not only because weapons locating radars (WLR) may not penetrate that deep, but also because at those distances, poor Target Location Errors (TLE) and extended time-of-flight make      reactive counterfire in the Corps deep area ineffective. The Corps will also be forced to clear the air for Field Artillery (FA) fires since it is likely beyond the FSCL. Flying assets are much more responsive beyond the FSCL by design and are better suited for detecting and delivering against fleeting targets.

Division AOs are where all the reactive and some of the proactive counterfire happens,; mostly with Army-owned      assets, much of which is task organized to them from Corps. Corps must enable this through the establishment of Command and Support relationships to give the necessary FA assets (entire FABs for example) to Divisions for this purpose and not retaining them at the Corps level. Corps do not need many FA assets because of their focus in the operational framework (the Corps deep area).  Most indirect fires happen short of the FSCL, which should almost completely fall within the Divisions’ AO’s.

            The Corps counterfire fight is proactive targeting in execution, leveraged towards degrading the enemy’s integrated fires system and long-range fires capabilities, mostly with joint assets that are allocated to them intended to set conditions for subordinate Divisions. The Division counterfire fight is mostly reactive supported by proactive targeting enabled by the integration of Corps assets in the Division AO. Understanding the relationships and responsibilities of Divisions and Corps are key to effectively planning for and integrating counterfire.

Annotated Bibliography

Department of the Army, Field Artillery Counterfire and Weapons Locating Radar Operations, (ATP 3-09.12). Washington DC. Department of the Army, 2021.

ATP 3-09.12 describes proactive and reactive counterfire and counterfire concepts. Corps primarily set conditions, or proactive counterfire, and Division as receivers of Corps capabilities. Reactive counterfire is based on responsiveness.

Department of the Army, DIVARTY Operations, (ATP 3-09.90). Washington DC. Department of the Army, 2021.                                           

Referencing roles of the DIVARTY as the FFAHQ in a Division and either serving as or assigning Counterfire HQ responsibilities

Department of the Army, Corps Operations, (ATP 3-92). Washington DC. Department of the Army, 2016.                                           

Older doctrine. May not be as relevant but may need to highlight some concepts here.

Department of the Army, Operations, (FM 3-0). Washington DC. Department of the Army, 2024.                                                            

FM 3-0 as keystone doctrine. Basis of describing strategic framework and areas of operation.

Department of the Army, Army Targeting, (FM 3-60). Washington DC. Department of the Army, 2024.                                                          

FM 3-0 as keystone doctrine. Basis of describing strategic framework and areas of operation.

Department of the Army, Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations, (FM 3-09). Washington DC. Department of the Army, 2024.                                         

Updates to FM 3-09 that nests concepts within MDO, strategic framework, and responsibilities of Corps and Division areas of operations.

Joint Force Development, Joint Fire Support, (JP 3-09). Washington DC. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024.                                                    

FSCL is defined in Joint Doctrine which highlights the inherent joint nature of the FSCM and the joint integration that planning for a FSCM requires.